USS: a story of faith-based risk management

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USS

USS: recent history

- Pre-2011: Final salary;
- 2011 valuation: Final salary section closed to new entrants; career average scheme introduced;
- 2014 valuation: Final salary closed to new accrual; hybrid scheme (CARE up to £55k, DC above) for all;
- 2017 valuation: Move to close DB section entirely led to major industrial dispute in Higher Education.



Report to the USS paper: 2014 Actuarial Valuation A Consultation on the proposed assumptions for the scheme's technical provisions and recovery plan

Link: Report to the USS paper: 2014 Actuarial Valuation, First Actuarial. November 2014


First Actuarial's 2014 report

The report contained critiques of

- ongoing vs closed schemes;
- the role of trustees as distinct from that of regulators;
- 'gilts-plus' approaches to setting discount rates;
- de-risking, and the potential for a 'vicious circle';
- USS's risk-management approach, particularly 'Test 1'.

CONCLUSIONS

- 4.38 The "reliance on covenant" test proposed by the trustee appears to be the foundation of the its strong demands for lower risk/lower return investment and lower benefits. The measure, as proposed by the trustee, is deeply flawed, for the following reasons:
 - The opening amount, of perhaps £6.6bn, is much less than the available support from the employers which, following the covenant advice, can be relied upon to be £10bn over 20 years. In extremis, the available support is up to £35bn (see paragraph 4.26).
 - The reliance on covenant calculation is unsound:
 - It is structured to worsen with time as there is turnover from the final salary to the CRB sections
 - It is inadequately inflated to reflect the potential for economic growth built into the projection of the liabilities
 - It is the unreliable difference of two large numbers



Link: Understanding Test 1 (video playlist), Sam Marsh for Sheffield UCU, March 2017

REPORT OF THE JOINT EXPERT PANEL

September 2018

Link: Report of the Joint Expert Panel, September 2018

	Assets	Technical provisions liabilities	Self-sufficiency liabilities
Projected Year 20 values (no de-risking)	£78.2bn*	£59.2bn*	£81.0bn
Projected Year 20 values (September de-risking)	£74.6bn*	£71.0bn	£81.0bn
Projected Year 20 values (November de-risking)	£71.0bn*	£71.0bn	£81.0bn

Source: Discussion document for the University of Sheffield

USS Working Group, Sam Marsh, October 2018

USS's valuation rests on a large and demonstrable mistake

When corrected there is no deficit as at 31 March 2018 and no need for detrimental changes to benefits or contributions



[UPDATE 29 Oct: Here I provide further documentation, via reference to statements and a graph in a May 2018 video by their Chief Risk Officer, that USS has made a large and demonstrable mistake regarding Test 1.]

Link: USS's valuation rests on a large and demonstrable mistake, Mike Otsuka, October 2018

10 Year Horizon:



Source: USS presentation to Imperial, November 2017

More information

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Sheffield UCU's 2014 valuation resources:
http://ucu.group.shef.ac.uk/campaigns/pensions/
disputed-2014-valuation-of-uss/
Sheffield UCU's 2017 valuation resources:
http://ucu.group.shef.ac.uk/campaigns/pensions/
uss-2017-valuation-resources/
USSbriefs: https://medium.com/ussbriefs
Twitter: https://twitter.com/Sam Marsh101
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